No. 98-1280
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1998
EARL ANTHONY WEBB, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JAMES K. ROBINSON
Assistant Attorney General
JOSEPH C. WYDERKO
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1) provides that a "notice
of appeal must," among other things, "name the court to which
the appeal is taken." The question presented is:
Whether the court of appeals erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal because
of his failure to designate in his notice of appeal the court to which he
was appealing, where other information in the notice adequately identified
the appellate court.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1998
No. 98-1280
EARL ANTHONY WEBB, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-6a) is reported at 157
F.3d 451.
JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered its judgment on October 1, 1998. On December
23, 1998, Justice Stevens extended the time for filing a petition for a
writ of certiorari to and including February 19, 1999, and the petition
was filed on February 10, 1999. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
After entering a guilty plea in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, petitioner was convicted of one count of conspiracy
to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846. He was sentenced to
360 months' imprisonment. Pet. App. 2a, 8a.
1. In February 1995, petitioner and six co-defendants were indicted for
conspiring to distribute cocaine. After a jury was impaneled, two of petitioner's
co-defendants decided to plead guilty. In light of that development, petitioner
and the remaining co-defendants also pleaded guilty. Pet. App. 2a. The following
day, petitioner wrote a letter to the district court, on behalf of himself
and two co-defendants, stating that their pleas were entered as a result
of pressure and asking to withdraw them. After a hearing, the district court
found no adequate reason to allow petitioner to withdraw his plea and accordingly
denied petitioner's motion. Ibid.
Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal in the district court that had
entered the conviction, in which he "[gave] notice of the appeal of
his final conviction and sentence entered of record on January 9, 1997."
Pet. App. 3a, 9a. Petitioner's notice of appeal did not name the court to
which the appeal was taken. Ibid. It did, however, identify the district
court from which the appeal was taken and the presiding judge, and it also
provided the criminal-case docket number. Id. at 9a.
2. The court of appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Pet. App. 1a-6a. The court initially noted that "the district court's
refusal to allow [petitioner] to withdraw his guilty plea did not constitute
an abuse of discretion" and that the court of appeals had been "prepared
* * * to affirm the judgment of the district court on that basis."
Id. at 3a. The court held, however, that it lacked jurisdiction over petitioner's
appeal. The court noted that Rule 3(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure "requires that a notice of appeal * * * name the court to
which the party or parties are appealing," Pet. App. 5a (emphasis omitted),
and that the Rule's requirements were "jurisdictional in nature,"
id. at 4a (quoting Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992)). Because petitioner's
notice of appeal "neglect[ed] to name the court to which his appeal
[was] taken as required under Rule 3(c)," the court concluded that
the notice "failed to confer jurisdiction upon this court, notwithstanding
any absence of prejudice to the government." Id. at 6a.
3. On January 21, 1999, the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en banc in Dillon
v. United States, No. 97-3138, to reconsider whether a prospective appellant's
failure to identify the appropriate court of appeals by name in his notice
of appeal automatically deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
1. We agree with petitioner (Pet. 5-12) that the court of appeals erred
in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over his appeal. Where, as here, the
notice of appeal contains on its face other information from which the proper
appellate tribunal can be discerned, such as the name of the district court
from which the judgment originates and sufficient identifying information
about the subject matter to foreclose jurisdiction in any non-regional court
of appeals, the technical deviation from Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
3(c)'s terms does not deprive the court of appeals of jurisdiction.
Rule 3(c)(1) directs that a notice of appeal must contain three elements
to be effective: (1) it "must * * * specify the party or parties taking
the appeal;" (2) it "must * * * designate the judgment, order,
or part thereof being appealed;" and (3) it "must * * * name the
court to which the appeal is taken." This Court has held that "Rule
3(c)'s dictates are jurisdictional in nature, and their satisfaction is
a prerequisite to appellate review. * * * [N]oncompliance is fatal to an
appeal." Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992).
Rule 3(c)(4) further provides, however, that "[a]n appeal must not
be dismissed for informality of form or title." This Court, moreover,
has held that, even if a notice of appeal is "technically at variance
with the letter of a procedural rule," the court of appeals will have
jurisdiction if "the litigant's action is the functional equivalent
of what the rule requires." Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S.
312, 316-317 (1988); see also Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. at 248 ("[C]ourts
should construe Rule 3 liberally when determining whether it has been complied
with.").
The court of appeals accordingly erred in treating the notice of appeal's
failure to identify the Sixth Circuit by name as dispositive of the jurisdictional
inquiry. Instead, the court should have gone on to inquire whether the content
of the notice of appeal otherwise reasonably conveyed the same information
and thus performed the "functional equivalent" of naming the appellate
tribunal.
Petitioner's notice of appeal did that. The notice identified the judgment
subject to appeal as originating from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan and as involving review of his "final
conviction and sentence." Pet. App. 9a. The docket number's use of
"CR" further confirmed that the appeal was from a judgment in
a criminal case. See ibid. By law, an appeal from the Eastern District of
Michigan in a criminal case could proceed to only one court of appeals-the
Sixth Circuit. 28 U.S.C. 41, 1291, 1294(1). Petitioner therefore provided
fair notice that his appeal was being taken to the Sixth Circuit. See Smith
v. Barry, 502 U.S. at 248 ("[T]he notice afforded by a document * *
* determines the document's sufficiency as a notice of appeal.").1
2. We disagree, however, with petitioner's contention (Pet. 5-12) that plenary
review or summary resolution of the issue is appropriate at this time. As
previously noted (see also Pet. 5 n.2), the Sixth Circuit has granted rehearing
en banc in another case, Dillon v. United States, No. 97-3138 (Jan. 21,
1999), to reconsider the very issue raised by the petition. By letter dated
February 24, 1999, the United States advised the Sixth Circuit that it did
not agree with the panel's jurisdictional analysis in Dillon and thus would
oppose the panel's judgment before the en banc court. The Sixth Circuit
has ordered simultaneous briefs to be filed by April 26, 1999, and has scheduled
oral argument for June 9, 1999.
Petitioner's claim of a circuit conflict and departure from this Court's
precedents (Pet. 5-12) is thus premature. If the en banc Sixth Circuit agrees
with the United States and petitioner here and holds that Rule 3(c) is satisfied
by notices of appeal that contain information that is functionally equivalent
to identifying the appellate court by name, there will be no circuit conflict
or deviation from this Court's decisions for this Court to address. Petitioner,
however, should be put in a position to have any such rule applied to him.
Thus, while plenary review is not currently warranted, it is appropriate
to give the Sixth Circuit the opportunity to reconsider its jurisdictional
ruling in this case in light of the position ultimately adopted by the en
banc court in Dillon.2 Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari
should be granted, the judgment of the court of appeals should be vacated,
and the case should be remanded for disposition in light of the en banc
court's eventual decision in Dillon v. United States, supra.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted, the judgment should
be vacated, and the case should be remanded to the court of appeals for
disposition in light of the en banc Sixth Circuit's eventual decision in
Dillon v. United States, No. 97-3138.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
JAMES K. ROBINSON
Assistant Attorney General
JOSEPH C. WYDERKO
Attorney
APRIL 1999
1 Petitioner correctly recognizes (Pet. 5-7) that the court of appeals'
decision in this case is inconsistent with decisions of the District of
Columbia, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. See Bradley v. Work, 154 F.3d 704,
707 (7th Cir. 1998) ("This court has held that it will not dismiss
on mere technicalities, including in the naming of the court to which a
judgment is being appealed, if the notice as a whole is not misleading.");
Anderson v. District of Columbia, 72 F.3d 166, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per
curiam) ("[A]lthough Anderson named the wrong appellate court in his
notice of appeal, because it was obvious in which court his appeal properly
lay, Anderson gave fair notice to the opposing party and the court."
); McLemore v. Landry, 898 F.2d 996, 999 (5th Cir.) ("River Villa's
intent to appeal to this court is made manifest by the fact that this is
the only court to which an appeal may be had."), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 966 (1990).
2 The government will advise this Court of any decision by the en banc Sixth
Circuit in Dillon if such a decision is issued before this Court's disposition
of the instant petition.